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Post–Cold War Images of Finland’s Neutrality
and Identity
The view of most scholars and other authors is that Finland’s neutrality was the
result of a hard-core realistic assessment of the political facts of the post-1945
world and their meaning for a small country. Because of this, Finland’s policy
of neutrality, in contrast to Sweden’s, for example, never became an integral
part of Finnish identity. Neutrality in this view was of secondary importance,
a pragmatic instrument for keeping Finland on the Western side of the Iron
Curtain. The main priority was to find options that allowed for as much West
European integration as possible, in line with Finland’s inherently Western
identity. Neutrality in this context was not desirable—it was a posture Finland
was forced to adopt by the geopolitical facts of the Cold War and Finland’s
drift into the politically challenging area between East and West—but it was
the best option available at the time.1
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of its geopolitical
structure, neutrality became obsolete, unwelcome baggage as Finland pursued
membership in the European Union (EU) from 1992 onward. Neutrality did
not fit the image of Finland as an active and committed EU member, and,
having been employed merely as an instrument to secure Finland’s imme-
diate security interests and national survival, it could be abandoned almost
overnight. A new national consensus concerning Finland’s entry into the EU
1. For recent studies and other historically reflective accounts that demonstrate this widely shared inter-
pretation see, for example, Erkka Railo, “Pienen valtion selviytymisstrategia,” in Erkka Railo and Ville
Laamanen, eds., Suomi muuttuvassa maailmassa: Ulkosuhteiden ja kansallisen itseymma¨rryksen historiaa
(Helsinki: Edita, 2010); Jukka Tarkka, Karhun kainalossa: Suomen kylma¨ sota 1947–1990 (Helsinki:
Otava, 2012); Jaakko Blomberg, Vakauden kaipuu: Kylma¨n sodan loppu ja Suomi (Helsinki: WSOY,
2011); Paavo Lipponen, Ja¨rki voittaa: Suomalainen identiteetti globalisaation aikakaudella (Helsinki:
Otava 2008); and Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio, Missa¨ on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan
historia ja geopolitiikka (Tampere, Finland: Vastapaino:, 2000).
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followed. “No longer are we watching developments from a position restrained
by the straitjacket of our Cold War neutrality,” the secretary of state at the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs put it in 1999.2 Finland’s EU membership, as well as the
security it provided, was seen as a welcome substitute for the country’s policy of
neutrality and as a way for Finland to prove its “long-repressed Western iden-
tity.” The 1990s came generally to be hailed as the “golden era” of Finland’s
identity project, the decade when Finland was finally able to join the West.3
A closer look, however, reveals that two versions of the Finnish “Western
identity thesis” came into being in the 1990s. One stressed Finland’s “return to
the West” through the EU. The other emphasized Finland’s essential Western-
ness during the Cold War and saw EU membership merely as a confirmation
and entrenchment of this fact. Both post–Cold War narratives served the same
political-identity purpose of legitimizing Finland’s EU membership and helped
to position it as a break “with the ties that bind us with the past,” as Foreign
Trade Minister Pertti Salolainen—a notable supporter of Finnish membership
in both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—said
in a parliamentary debate in 1992.4
Although matters of identity have been accorded a central role in Finland’s
“return to the West” and its EU accession, their role in the policy of neutrality
has attracted only negative attention (when it has received any attention at
all). In the prevailing interpretations of Finnish history and identity, the Cold
War period, with its policy of neutrality, stands out mainly as a deviation
from Finland’s essentially Western self or has been detached from Finnish
identity altogether. As Paavo Lipponen, the Social Democratic prime minister
of Finland from 1995 to 2003, wrote in 2008, neutrality came to an end with
the end of the Cold War and has no role whatsoever for Finland in the context
of the new Europe. Because neutrality, the argument goes, was never anything
more than a policy line chosen on purely pragmatic grounds, it leaves behind
no legacy.5
2. Jukka Valtasaari, “A Finnish Perspective on the Changing Europe,” Speech given in the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai, 10 February 1999.
3. For discussion of Finland’s 1990s identity politics, see Harle and Moisio, Missa¨ on Suomi? pp. 56,
275, 282. Viewing the same trends from another perspective, Christopher Browning speaks of a “post-
finlandization” and “Westernizing” narrative in Finland’s identity and foreign policy of the 1990s.
See, Christopher Browning, “Coming Home or Moving Home? ‘Westernising’ Narratives in Finnish
Foreign Policy and the Re-interpretation of Past Identities,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 37, No. 1
(March 2002), pp. 47–72.
4. Valtiopa¨iva¨t 1992, po¨yta¨kirjat 1 (1993), p. 647; and Klaus To¨rnudd, “Ties That Bind to the Recent
Past: Debating Security Policy in Finland within the Context of the Membership in the European
Union,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 37–68.
5. Lipponen, Ja¨rki voittaa, pp. 212–213.
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In this article we argue that the prevailing image of Finland’s Cold War
neutrality is essentially a product of the post–Cold War era. Although this
image has served Finland’s domestic and European integration policies since
the mid-1990s, it cannot be taken as a sufficient, historically accurate ex-
planation of Finnish neutrality. Our understanding of this topic needs to be
buttressed with historical research. In this article we ask whether neutrality
did have meaning for Cold War Finland’s political identity, and we focus on
continuities that have been largely neglected both in the public debate and in
existing scholarly research.
Neutrality in the Shadow of the Soviet Union
The present-day image—emphasizing neutrality’s instrumentalist character—
is illustrative of Finland’s complex relationship with its own policy of
neutrality.6 This ambiguity at the core of Finnish neutrality goes back to
the earliest Cold War years: of all the European neutrals discussed in this spe-
cial issue of the journal, Finland’s Cold War neutrality was perhaps the most
precarious. Finland’s lengthy border with the Soviet Union was bound to have
a direct influence on Finnish foreign and defense policies. Further, Finland’s
attempts to consolidate its neutrality never ceased to be conditioned by its
bilateral security pact with the Soviet Union. This pact, the Soviet-Finnish
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (the FCMA Treaty),
was signed in 1948 and then extended for twenty-year periods in 1955, 1973,
and 1983.
The first article of the treaty obliged Finland, “in the eventuality of Fin-
land, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of
an armed attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter . . . true to
its obligations as an independent state, [to] fight to repel the attack.” Fur-
thermore, in the event of such an attack, Finland was to “use all its available
forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do
so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in
the present Treaty and, if necessary, with the assistance of, or jointly with the
Soviet Union.”7
From Finland’s perspective, the most important point was that the treaty
differed in several respects from similar treaties signed by the USSR with the
6. Tarkka, Karhun kainalossa.
7. J. A. S. Greenville, ed., The Major International Treaties, 1914–1973 (London: Methuen 1974),
p. 364, emphasis added.
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East European countries in 1947. First, the treaty applied solely to Finnish
territory, making Finland responsible for the defense of its own borders and
territory but not obligating it to participate in any military action outside
this area. Second, although the treaty mentioned the possibility of Soviet
military assistance, it specified no mechanisms for automatically triggering
such assistance. All such decisions were to be preceded by mutual political
consultation.
The culmination of the Geneva spirit of de´tente opened the way for
more ambitious elaborations of neutrality in Europe in the mid-1950s, and
the specifics of the FCMA Treaty allowed Finland to make plausible claims
for military non-alignment and neutrality.8 In the case of Austria, another
newcomer neutral, the Austrian State Treaty (1955) marked the end of the Four
Powers occupation and the restoration of the country’s sovereignty. Permanent
neutrality was also anchored in the country’s Federal Constitutional Law.9 In
Finland, the renewal of the FCMA Treaty in 1955 was accompanied by an
explicit mutual declaration that the treaty was based on respect for Finland’s
wish to follow a policy of neutrality. After 1955, the foreign policy orientations
of both Austria and Finland were, albeit for different reasons, forged within
a broader policy framework resting on more firmly established examples of
neutrality; namely, Switzerland and especially Sweden, whose example Austria
and Finland followed when they joined the United Nations (UN) in 1955–
1956.10
The possibility of consultations over Soviet military assistance never dis-
appeared from the horizon of Finland’s neutrality policy. This potential means
of exercising control over Finland raised questions that hung over all ma-
jor crises in Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Inside Finland,
the desire to avoid calls for consultations led to efforts to anticipate poten-
tially negative Soviet reactions. This practice would lead to international and
domestic debates on “Finlandization.” The concept appeared in Austria in
the 1950s, with frequent references to Finland as an undesirable model of
8. Finland had aspired to remain neutral before and during the Second World War but was un-
successful. In the negotiations over the FCMA Treaty in 1948, Finland’s delegation was determined
to include in the text a paragraph explaining that Finland’s aim was to remain outside the super-
power conflicts. For Finland, this sentence was key to later elaborations of the country’s Cold War
neutrality.
9. On Austria see, for example, Michael Gehler, “From Non-alignment to Neutrality: Austria’s Trans-
formation during the First East-West De´tente, 1953–1958,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4
(Fall 2005), pp. 104–136.
10. Johanna Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland
(New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 53–59, 62–64.
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neutrality, and it became internationally known in the 1970s, especially in
Germany.11
Suspicion toward neutrality was common on the Western side of the Cold
War divide. In general, any fuzziness along the interface zones between the
two blocs was seen as a source of undesired unpredictability.12 Furthermore,
if the states located on these intermediary zones were small and aimed at
neutrality, this simply added to the unpredictability. In a world ruled by hard
power, small states were seen as incapable of resisting the external pressures
and manipulation that were thought to be part of the day-to-day repertoire
of Cold War politics. In this light, Finland’s neutrality seemed particularly
vulnerable.
From the Soviet perspective, Finland’s attempts at credible neutrality
remained burdened by recent Finnish history. On several occasions, the Soviet
Union used Finland’s previous German connections to question the credibility
of Finland’s neutrality policy. During the early part of World War II, Finland
was attacked by the Soviet Union and fought a brief but intense war against
the Red Army, and later on during the war Finland was in a de facto military
alliance with Germany. The fear of Finland allying with a revitalized West
Germany was a key factor motivating Soviet reservations about Finland’s
participation in international organizations and, later, in European integration,
which the Soviet Union interpreted as Western bloc-building.
After the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was ousted from power in
October 1964, the mood in Moscow began to change with regard to the
desirability of Finland’s active neutrality policy. After the Soviet-led invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet leaders withdrew their acknowledgment of
Finland’s neutrality, causing a prolonged schism between Finnish and Soviet
foreign policy officials on how to define Finland’s foreign policy in official
documents and public statements. Unsurprisingly, this coincided with a new
eagerness on the part of the United States and other Western countries to
11. A good contemporary summary of the Finlandization debate, as well as a Finnish response to the
criticism voiced in the West, is Max Jakobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 58, No. 5 (Summer 1980), pp. 1034–1044. In the 2010s, the concept of Finlandization has
attracted renewed interest in discussions of China’s relations with Taiwan. See Bruce Gilley, “Not So
Dire Straits. How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1
(January/February 2010), pp. 44–60; and Vang Chang, Hans Mouritzen, and Bruce Gilley, “To the
Finland Station: Is Taiwan Selling Out to China?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010),
pp. 128–133.
12. The potential for shifting alignments was at the core of Hans J. Morgenthau’s idea of the balance
of power in Power among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948).
In Morgenthau’s view, the commitment of “nations” to alliances provided the cornerstone of stability
in the prevailing Cold War bloc system.
55
Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi
proclaim and praise Finland’s neutrality. But the unintended consequence was
that Finland’s neutrality was effectively called into question in Finno-Soviet
relations. Not until autumn 1989, when Mikhail Gorbachev visited Helsinki,
did the Soviet Union acknowledge Finland’s neutrality without reservations.
Even though the foundations and credibility of Finnish neutrality were
considered to be shaky for a long time, both internationally and domestically,
the suspicions were to be alleviated by practical considerations concerning the
need for reconsolidation in postwar Europe. The superpowers tacitly accepted
neutrality as a fact on the ground in the division of Europe, and the neutral
countries, in turn, found an active role in multilateral diplomacy. For each of
the neutrals other than Switzerland, which did not join the UN, the United
Nations became a key arena in which to demonstrate a distinctive policy line
and to monitor the other neutrals’ stances on international disputes. From the
1960s onward, European neutrality was more and more associated with an
active foreign policy stance. Neutrality was no longer seen as isolationism or
exceptionalism but as a legitimate policy allowing small developed countries
to play a constructive role as mediators in international conflicts and as hosts
of superpower summits and negotiations. Austria, Switzerland, and especially
Sweden used neutrality as a platform from which to express critical views
on Cold War issues, whereas Finland pursued a lower profile, more “doctor”
than “judge” in international relations, as President Urho Kekkonen (1956–
1981) once said. Nevertheless, the peak of European Cold War neutrality—
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—was also
the high point of Finland’s neutrality policies. The CSCE’s Final Accords were
signed in Helsinki in 1975.13
Neutrality as History
Despite these positive developments, neutrality remained vulnerable to the
suspicions and tensions in East-West relations throughout the Cold War. This
was the case not only with Finnish neutrality but with all neutral states.
13. Many historians have recently addressed neutrality in their studies of the CSCE process. See, for
instance, Thomas Fischer, Neutral Power in CSCE: The N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki
Accords (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009). On Finland in particular, see Seppo Hentila¨, “Finland and the
German States: Finland’s German Policy in the Framework of European Detente,” in Wilfried Loth
and Georges-Henri Soutou, eds., The Making of De´tente: Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the Cold
War (London: Routledge, 2008); and Juhana Aunesluoma, “Finlandization in Reverse: The CSCE and
the Rise and Fall of Economic Detente, 1968–1975,” in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds.,
Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 98–112.
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Additionally, as the bipolar divide of international relations intensified, new
challenges to the credibility of neutrality emerged. As a result, the scope of
neutrality grew, and what had started as military non-alignment in peace-
time came to encompass a much wider field of policymaking by the 1970s
and 1980s. No longer just a part of foreign and security policy, neutrality
increasingly influenced and shaped domestic politics.
Practicing neutrality required sensitivity and balancing skills from policy-
makers and analysts throughout the Cold War. One illustration of this is how
much of the Cold War–era literature on Finland’s neutrality was written by
practitioners: diplomats and journalists, as well as the era’s most prominent
experts on national history, international law, military strategy, and interna-
tional politics. Literature on neutrality was especially plentiful in the neutral
countries, and the research produced from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s
allows the tracing of a relatively coherent picture of contemporary European
neutrality. This literature, which is oriented toward policy, emphasizes the
positive contributions of the small European neutrals to the international
community in the form of such tasks as “bridge-building,” UN peacekeeping,
and the hosting of summits.14
Once a core topic in the political science literature, neutrality became a
historians’ topic in the 1990s.15 The availability of new archival sources gave
rise to a series of monographs that examined the early phases of European
neutrality. Jussi Hanhima¨ki’s Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the
“Finnish Solution,” published in 1997, paved the way for post–Cold War stud-
ies that have contributed greatly to a more detailed understanding of Finland
in the Cold War. The regular release of new archival sources has provided
the basis for this new stream of neutrality research, with the availability of
documents determining the time periods covered by analyses. Seppo Hen-
tila¨ has carried out internationally recognized research on Finland’s relations
with the two German states, and Kimmo Rentola has explored the Finnish
Communists’ relationship with the Soviet Union.16 In addition to studies that
14. A useful outline of postwar European neutrality is provided in Harto Hakovirta, East-West Conflict
and European Neutrality (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 1988). This study, which came out in
the sunset years of the Cold War, is also valuable from the historical point of view and is therefore used
here not only as a research tool but as an illustration of the understanding of neutrality concepts in the
late Cold War period.
15. For an overview of the existing literature on Finland in the Cold War, see Mikko Majander, “Post–
Cold War Historiography in Finland,” in Thorsten B. Olesen, ed., The Cold War—and the Nordic
Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004),
pp. 43–82.
16. Hentila¨ has published several studies in Finnish and articles in German and English. See, for
example, Seppo Hentila¨, Neutral zwischen den beiden Deutschen Staaten: Finnland und Deutschland im
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have made use of archival material in the Soviet Union, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, a newer strand of historical research focuses
on recently released materials from Finland’s national archives.17
Although the existing research has made remarkable contributions, its
focus has been more on Finland’s international position than on neutrality, and
its methodology has mostly aligned with the classical tradition of diplomatic
and political history. The role of Finland’s presidents, Juho Kusti Paasikivi
(1946–1956) and Urho Kekkonen (1956–1982), has received much of the
attention. At the same time, the research provides ample evidence that Finnish
neutrality was initially regarded with skepticism by other countries, gaining
limited credence only over time. Finland’s own actions also left it open to
justified criticism, regardless of the apparent sincerity of the country’s attempts
at neutrality.
Although the flaws of neutrality, as revealed by the careful scrutiny of
diplomatic and policy documents, have led many historians to neglect the
topic altogether, we suggest a different take. The imperfections, contested
nature, and problematic credibility of Finnish Cold War neutrality should
Kalten Krieg (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006). Kimmo Rentola has studied the triangular
interrelationship of the Finnish Communists, President Urho Kekkonen, and the Soviet Union. See
Kimmo Rentola, Niin kylma¨a¨ etta¨ polttaa: Kommunistit, Kreml (Helsinki: Otava, 1997); and Kimmo
Rentola, Vallankumouksen aave: Vasemmisto, Kekkonen ja Beljakov 1970 (Helsinki: Otava, 2005). See
also Mikko Majander, Pohjoismaa vai kansandemokratia? Sosiaalidemokraatit, kommunistit ja Suomen
kansainva¨linen asema 1944–1951 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2004), which focuses
on Social Democrats, including their Scandinavian connections. Majander has published further
results of his studies on Finnish social democracy and the Cold War in Mikko Majander, Demokratiaa
dollareilla: SDP ja puoluerahoitus pulataloudessa 1945–1954 (Helsinki: Otava, 2007), which charts
the origins of the Social Democrats’ party finances during the Cold War and, especially, the Social
Democrats’ Western contacts. Research by a younger generation of Finnish scholars published in
English includes Aappo Ka¨ho¨nen, The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War: The Finnish Card in the
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956–1959 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2006), which is based
on Soviet archives. A study that widens the analysis of the economic Cold War using British sources is
Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, Hitting Them Hard? Promoting British Export Interests in Finland, 1957–1972
(Helsinki: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 2006).
17. Illustrative examples are Timo Soikkanen’s studies focusing on the history of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as the “President’s Ministry.” See Timo Soikkanen, Presidentin ministerio¨: Ulkoasian-
hallinto ja ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003); and
Timo Soikkanen, Presidentin ministerio¨: Ulkoasianhallinto ja ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella,
Vol. 2, Uudistumisen, ristiriitojen ja menetyksen aika 1970–1981 (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, 2003). See also Pekka Visuri’s overview of Finland’s defense policies during the Kekkonen
era—Pekka Visuri, Ida¨n ja La¨nnen va¨lissa¨: Puolustuspolitiikka presidentti Kekkosen kaudella (Helsinki:
National Defense University, 2010)—and Juhana Aunesluoma’s study of Finland’s foreign trade and
integration policies from 1917 to 1995: Juhana Aunesluoma, Vapaakaupan tiella¨: Suomen kauppa- ja
integraatiopolitiikka maailmansodista EU-aikaan (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2011).
Finally, Rentola’s analysis of the history of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO)—
Kimmo Rentola, Ratakatu 12: Suojelupoliisin historia 1939–2009 (Helsinki: WSOY, 2009)—
demonstrates that SUPO had close contacts with the Western intelligence services throughout the Cold
War.
58
Finland’s Quest for Security in the Cold War
be seen not as the endpoint of discussion but as a starting point for a new
wave of research. Despite flaws, Finnish neutrality was powerful both as a
self-constructed symbol and as a political and social practice in its own time.
It influenced people’s thinking and self-image. Cold War-era neutrality in
Finland is thus worth studying, but with an approach that leans more on
a social constructivist epistemology, which allows us to analyze aspects of
neutrality that have proved most durable. These include neutrality’s role in the
formation of political identity, a role that has not attracted much attention in
previous considerations of Finland’s Cold War neutrality.
Neutrality and the Politics of Identity in Finland
This article makes several interrelated claims. First, historical research materials
do not provide much support for the argument that Finland’s neutrality in
the Cold War period was free of identity politics. The claimed pragmatism
of Finland’s policy of neutrality does not, as such, exclude the possibility of
identity politics. The idea of Finland’s neutrality as distinctively “pragmatic”
was initially voiced in relation to international law, according to which Finland,
strictly speaking, did not meet the criteria of a neutral state because of the 1948
FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union. One—perhaps the number one—task of
Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War was to find the semantic tools and
practical interpretations of the 1948 treaty that would allow Finland to make
its claims for neutrality credible.18 This was a choice not between identity and
pragmatism but between legalism and pragmatism. However, after a certain
amount of repetition, the emphasis on pragmatism began to take on the
elements of a political identity.
Second, the five decades from 1945 to 1995 cannot be regarded as a time
when Finland merely drifted along in a position that contemporaries saw as
completely alien to the nation’s political identity. Identity projects were a real
part of Cold War Finland, being centered on the policy of neutrality and the
defense of that policy’s credibility in the eyes of international and domestic
18. A good example of the Finns’ efforts to interpret the 1948 treaty so as to allow for Finland’s
credible neutrality is Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968). Among the
numerous memoirs by Finnish Foreign Ministry officials that offer useful vantage points on the
issue, see Risto Hyva¨rinen, Virkamiehia¨, viekkautta ja vakoilua (Helsinki: Otava, 2000); and Keijo
Korhonen, Sattumakorpraali: Korhonen Kekkosen komennossa (Helsinki: Otava, 1999). The eight-
volume authorized biography of President Kekkonen is a monumental study of the president’s reign
and was written by a Foreign Ministry diplomat, Juhani Suomi, Urho Kekkonen 1–8 (Helsinki: Otava,
1986–2000).
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audiences.19 Until recently, the policy of neutrality was one of the main threads
in the national narrative about Finland’s successful transformation from a
poor, backward country to a highly developed, peaceful, and socially egal-
itarian Nordic welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s. Neutrality—although
never completely undisputed—grew close, even dear, to the Finnish people
and elites and was therefore constitutive of Finland’s self-perception during
the Cold War. In addition, officials spared no effort in their attempts to make
neutrality popular, even beloved, among the people. These efforts were rela-
tively successful. By 1990, the idea of Finland’s neutrality had become deeply
internalized among both decision-makers and the broader public.20 Indeed,
neutrality had become a part of Finland’s national identity.
Third, the most abiding legacies of European Cold War neutrality are
found in the realm of identities and mentalities. This can be seen in the
remarkable degree of continuity in policy formulations at the highest decision-
making levels at the end of the Cold War. Further, despite the major changes
that took place in the 1990s—the end of the Cold War, the growth of the
EU, and active participation of the European neutrals in international crisis
management missions—none of the neutral countries chose to align militarily
with NATO. During the first 25 years after the end of the Cold War, popular
opinion in the neutral countries remained steady in its opposition to potential
NATO membership. Although sentiment has changed somewhat since 2014,
neutrality and the role of the non-involved mediator still enjoy a special place
in the minds of Finns, irrespective of the broader changes that have taken place
in the international order, the changing connotations attached to neutrality
itself, and the willingness of decision-makers to reconsider the matter.21
The Ideological Cold War, Neutrality,
and National Identity22
In the post-1945 period, conceptions of neutrality were politicized, forms of
neutrality were diversified, and all sides found a use for neutrality. Neutrality,
19. Louis Clerc, “Gaining Recognition and Understanding: Finland’s Image Policy, 1948–1966,”
forthcoming.
20. See, for instance, the opinion survey series conducted by the Advisory Board for Defense Informa-
tion (Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta, MTS) since the 1970s.
21. A good example of this view is a statement made by Markku Kivinen, the director of the Aleksanteri-
Institute, a Russian and East European studies center, at Helsinki University in September 2010,
maintaining that Finland should still be able to proclaim neutrality in future conflicts. See Markku
Kivinen, “Suurvaltojen eturistiriidat eiva¨t ole kadonneet,” Helsingin Sanomat, 23 September 2010.
22. This section and the two following sections draw from Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War.
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no longer just a wartime phenomenon, was gaining new significance as a
peacetime policy. The more “normalized” the Cold War contestation grew, the
greater the number of policy fields in which the credibility of neutrality could
be tested.
One of the testing grounds was created by the ideological contest between
the two systems of values and the competition for the “hearts and minds” of
ordinary people. This realm of confrontation, which the West saw as a battle
between democracy and authoritarian Communism, has attracted growing
attention in Cold War studies in recent years.23 The attention is justified:
Cold War contemporaries were intensely aware of the ideological dimensions
of the conflict and its impact on citizens in their everyday public lives, from
parliament to the workplace, from schools to civil society organizations and the
media. The ideological dimensions of the conflict preoccupied contemporary
minds irrespective of whether the people—citizens of one of the two blocs
or of the neutral states—wished to take sides in the struggle and irrespective
of whether they believed ideology “truly” mattered in world politics or was
simply the veil behind which the “real” interests and policies were pursued.
Regardless of whether the governments of the neutral countries saw the
Cold War bipolarity as a correct or desirable way to interpret international pol-
itics, the reality of Cold War ideological confrontation meant that neutrality
was to be tested in these terms. Western-oriented Cold Warriors asked loudly
in the early 1950s whether the requirements of neutrality were leading to
compromises in the neutrals’ commitment to democracy and to social, polit-
ical, and economic freedom. Eastern-oriented Cold Warriors, on the other
hand, doubted—ever more frequently as the 1950s progressed—that the
23. Today the view that the Cold War was an all-embracing contest between two “empires” trying
to prove “the universal applicability of their ideologies” is mainstream in Cold War research. See,
for instance, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of
Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Melvyn. P. Leffler, For the Soul of
Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007);
Mark Kramer, “Power, Politics, and the Long Duration of the Cold War,” in Silvio Pons and Federico
Romero, eds., Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations (London:
Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 21-40; and David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War,
1917–1962,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War,
Vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 20–43. For more recent research
on the battles over “the hearts and minds of the people,” see Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain:
Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945–1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998); Volker
Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shephard Stone between Philanthropy,
Academy and Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Giles Scott-Smith and
Hans Krabbendam, eds., The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960 (Portland, OR: Frank
Cass, 2003); and Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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neutrals’ commitment to a Western style of democracy, economy, and eco-
nomic integration could be reconciled with their obligations of true neutrality.
Although the neutrals have typically been thought of as separate national
vacuums outside the reach of the ideological Cold War, this separation was
not a given. On both sides of the divide, Cold War alliances were justified
with totalizing notions of a battle between good and evil that left scant room
for neutrality. The standard explanation given by the neutrals was that the
combination of democracy and neutrality was not and should not be a problem.
Quite the contrary. Sweden’s and Switzerland’s histories were underlined ever
more energetically as living proof of the mutually reinforcing interrelationship
between neutrality and democracy. However, the ideological bipolarization of
the Cold War affected the concept of neutrality in a way that even the strongest
of the neutrals could not ignore.
To retain “ownership” of their national policies of neutrality, and to pre-
vent neutrality from being undercut by the ever-more-politicized Cold War,
the European neutral countries increasingly took the initiative in articulating
their policies of neutrality. The national standpoints needed to be as precise
and easily comprehensible as possible. Neutrality had to be explained not only
to international audiences but also to policymakers, opinion makers, and the
people, the voters, at home. Unable to lean on allies outside state borders
and with the credibility of their neutrality under constant assessment from
outside, each neutral country’s government sought strong domestic support
for its policies. Reliance on a general conscript army strengthened the need for
clear-cut concepts and domestic consensus.
The continual need to be clear and articulate in order to keep the interna-
tional Cold War at a distance, combined with the particular need for a strong
domestic consensus, played a tremendous role in (1) the emergence of what,
since the end of the Cold War, has often been described as the neutrals’ own
“doctrinal truths”; and (2), in the creation of the formal and informal net-
works through which these “truths” were to be adopted in national society.24
By way of contrast to the two competing “ways of life” and as a defense
against the related battles over the hearts and minds of the people, each of
the European neutral countries chose to focus on the formulation of its own,
distinctive, national worldview—with neutrality and democracy as the corner-
stones. Neutrality and national identity were thus brought into close contact
with each other in all of the European neutral countries.
24. See Hakovirta, East-West Conflict, pp. 249–250.
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To the extent that the neutral countries managed to stay outside Cold War
confrontations—or at least managed to create the impression of remaining on
the sidelines—this status did not come about automatically. Rather it was the
result of conscious efforts and systematic policies that aimed to defend the
neutrals’ right to existence and to explain their ways of life in relation to
the bipolar global political scene.
Revising the Core Values of the Nation
and State in Finland
Finland, too, had policies that aimed to turn neutrality and democracy into
the “core values” of the nation and the state and to integrate them with what
today’s research literature calls national identity. These policies, which surfaced
in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, have been known from the outset as
henkinen maanpuolustus (HMP), a direct translation of Geistige Landesverteidi-
gung (GLV), the German-language term used in Switzerland since the 1930s.25
Inspiration was also drawn from the Swedish concept of psychological defense
(psykologiskt fo¨rsvar), but the Swiss approach, with its explicitly broader em-
phasis on state ideology, proved more attractive in Finland. This was not least
because of the widely felt need to rethink the foundations of the national ethos.
Finland had just lost a war and hoped to foster new, more amicable relations
with its eastern neighbor. The anti-Communist and anti-Soviet overtones of
its earlier posture had to be eliminated. Switzerland’s GLV policies proved to
be of great interest to Finland, just as they did for Austria, another newcomer
neutral engaged in a broad rethinking of its foreign policy posture at this
time.
In Finland, adoption of the HMP policies was facilitated by the need to put
an end to the pervasive disagreements among Finland’s non-Communist elites
that had marked public life throughout the 1950s. These disputes concerned
25. Geistige Landesverteidigung does not directly translate into English. The contemporary actors used
“spiritual national defense” when referring to the policy in international circles. The meaning of
“spiritual,” however, is not identical with geistige/henkinen, which can also be translated as “ideational.”
The GLV/HMP policies were policies of ideological defense—the term “defense” being intended to
draw an explicit connection to the ideological warfare being waged by the Cold War superpowers.
In Switzerland, GLV policy had been an official state policy since the 1930s. Its aim was to defend
the existence of the Swiss state and its distinctive ideological basis—that is, the ideals of democracy,
federalism, and neutrality—against the authoritarian regimes of the time. The policy was updated in
the 1950s to address the realities of the Cold War world, with Communism emerging as democracy’s
main enemy, even though a watchful eye was to be kept on the potential resurrection of the other
enemy—fascism—too.
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the domestic political consequences of the new relationship with the USSR
and the question of how to deal with Finland’s relatively sizeable Communist
movement. All sides shared the ideal of strong national consensus, but views on
how to define and achieve it varied. Many saw no need to break with the past
and believed that national thinking of the interwar period, perhaps fortified
with Cold War anti-Communism, would provide a good basis for national
unity and safeguard Finland’s sovereignty and democracy in the post-1945
world. Others argued that if a country such as Finland was to escape being
torn apart by the Cold War—from outside or from within—it could not afford
too much Communism or anti-Communism. To retain its independence and
democracy, Finland had to find a new middle way. By 1960—after the domestic
and Soviet political crises of the late 1950s—an increasing number of actors
agreed that in the ongoing “war of ideologies,” the lack of a “true national
compromise” benefited only the political forces that were suspected to be the
least loyal to the state, nation, and democracy. In this context, by offering
neutrality and democracy as cornerstones of a new national compromise, the
HMP policies made their contribution.
New National Thinking, Neutrality, and Democracy
In 1960 the Finnish government (with centrist political parties in the major-
ity) appointed an official state committee to investigate “the ideational and
attitudinal foundations of the citizens’ affection for their state” and their will-
ingness to defend its core values, by arms if necessary. The establishment of
the committee was inspired by the Swedish psychological defense policies that
had been updated in the early 1950s. Yet, even if the concept of psychologi-
cal defense—corresponding with psykologiskt fo¨rsvar in Sweden—remained on
the Finnish committee’s agenda, the committee consciously chose to adopt a
broader state-ideological approach modeled on the Swiss GLV.26
The committee members sensed that, in the context of the ideological
Cold War, patriotism itself—its key concepts, values, sources of motivation,
and objectives—had to be redefined and “modernized.” The old nationalist
sentiments would be of no help to citizens facing the propaganda of continual
ideological warfare in their everyday lives. The Finnish committee came to
rely on basic tools of modern sociology, especially ideas about the factors that
26. For a more detailed discussion of the models, see Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War, pp. 106–
108.
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strengthened group solidarity and helped to regulate societal conflict. In the
new, modernized national thinking, the officially recognized core values of
Finland as a state and nation were democracy and neutrality.
The committee’s report (1962/1964) concluded that, whereas the tradi-
tions of Nordic democracy were already widely known among the people and
were already an integral part of Finland’s political culture, the Cold War ide-
ological confrontation called for a deeper public understanding of the nature
of democratic rights and freedoms.27 The need to educate the public about
modern democracy was an ongoing concern, but the need for education about
a second core value, neutrality, was even more pronounced. As a national value,
neutrality was of more recent origin and therefore was not as widely or well
understood by policymakers and citizens.28
Tools for educating the public about democracy and neutrality were bor-
rowed from Sweden and, in particular, Switzerland, which was seen as the
oldest of all democracies. Swiss citizens were believed to identify so much
with the idea of defending the ideational basis of their state that the concepts
of “citizen, defender of democracy” and “soldier, defender of neutrality” had
merged. At the same time, the committee members stressed, the Swiss defense
ethos was thoroughly defensive by nature: it was not directed against anything
or anyone as such. This fit well with the idea of neutrality and, simultane-
ously, with the broader need to remove the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist
elements of Finland’s national ethos.
Drawing together the key factors of neutrality and democracy, the com-
mittee’s report concluded that “a patriotic mindset emerges if all citizens
voluntarily wish to maintain and develop the distinctive Finnish democratic
way of life in their fatherland, which in terms of foreign policy is neutral.”
This conclusion set forth a realistic national mission that was simultaneously
personal and close to all citizens, touching them in their daily routines and
opinion formation.29
To inculcate the new national thinking among the people, the state com-
mittee proposed the establishment of a permanent board that would coordinate
the work of subcommittees focused on different aspects of ideological defense
27. The report by the state committee was published in 1964. See Henkisen maanpuolustuksemme
perustekija¨t, sen kokonaistavoitteet ja eri alojen tehta¨va¨t seka¨ johto- ja suorituselimet sodan ja rauhan
aikana (Mikkeli, Finland: La¨nsisavon Kirjapaino, 1964).
28. Henkisen maanpuolustuksemme perustekija¨t, cited in Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War,
pp. 111–113.
29. Henkisen maanpuolustuksemme perustekija¨t; pp. 42–46, 139; and Ylioppilaslehti, 16 January 1961—
all cited in Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War, pp. 111–114.
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policy. This board (Henkisen maanpuolustuksen suunnittelukunta) became ac-
tive in 1963. Its main tasks included educating citizens about HMP (e.g., by
creating public sources of information); building (and polling) public opin-
ions about neutrality, democracy, and national defense; and conducting public
relations and research activities. According to one description, the board was
responsible for nearly all aspects of social and political opinion formation at all
layers of society, including state administration and political life, the media,
the education system, and the many voluntary associations in Finnish society.30
Whereas the state committee had consisted of a handful of experts (soci-
ologists, social psychologists, and analysts of Cold War military strategy and
international relations), the board involved a much wider spectrum of par-
ticipants. Around 50 individuals were more or less systematically involved in
the meetings of various subcommittees and other activities of the board.31
Among the board’s many subcommittees, the largest and most important was
the subcommittee for voluntary associations. Its participants represented more
than 40 associations, spanning the major areas of organized civil society. One
of the most influential participants was the trade unions confederation, whose
official commitment to the new national thinking was deemed important for
both contemporary and historical reasons.
From High Noon to Rising Criticism
The “high noon” of HMP policies in Finland dates to the mid-1960s. In 1964
the board began to arrange tailor-made seminars for key groups and opinion
makers in society and to compile lists of experts and journalists who could be
recommended as keynote speakers and authors. The board initiated the so-
called national defense courses that began to be organized annually in 1964 and
also surveyed opinions and attitudes toward foreign and security policy. In the
1960s, hundreds of people in influential positions at the national, regional,
and local levels of administration, within associations and other organized
30. Pertti Joenniemi, Sosiologian ensimma¨inen ja toinen kenta¨llinen: Osallistuminen henkisen maanpuolus-
tuksen suunnitelukunnan toimintaan, Tutkimustiedotteita No. 14. Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuslaitos
(Tampere, Finland: TUP,1978), p. 15. Joenniemi’s research paper is a contemporary analysis of the
participation of sociologists in ideological defense activities in the 1960s and 1970s.
31. The participants can be divided into four main groups: first, the group of “popular educators” and
teachers; second, representatives from the organized interest groups and various associations of civil
society (e.g., women, youth, sports, and other leisure-time organizations); third, civil servants (e.g.,
from the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and education); and fourth, military personnel, most of
whom were engaged in public relations, public information, and educational tasks.
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interest groups, and within media, the schools, and governmental agencies
participated in the activities organized by the HMP board.32
The board’s activities received much publicity. The mainstream reception
was positive, but the scale and ambition of the board’s projects ensured that it
did not escape criticism from either the traditional conservative right or the new
radical left, although criticism from the former group rapidly faded after 1964
with the rise of the New Left. New-Left criticism welcomed the new “pluralist”
readings of the nation but targeted the “alarmist and militarist worldview”
promoted by HMP policies. The ideological defenders of the nation, in this
view, not only neglected the most burning issues of contemporary world
politics (peace, disarmament, and social development), but also used the ideas
of a ceaseless ideological war as a pretext for attempting to militarize civil
society. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the New Left critics of the HMP
policies were challenged by even more radical far-left critics who accused
the HMP policies of being the bourgeoisie’s main weapon in the ideological
and psychological “trench warfare” whereby citizens were to be integrated
“in the spirit of the Winter War national unity” and Communism was to
be domesticated by integrating it into a nationalist, capitalist society. The
Communist Party of Finland (SKP), based in Moscow until 1944, loudly
demanded the dissolution of the HMP board.33 Soviet criticism was persistent
as well, often targeting Finnish interpretations of neutrality for supposedly
leaning too far to the West.34
Eventually, public opposition to the HMP policies grew so vehement
that the board declared itself unable to act. In 1975, a parliamentary com-
mittee recommended the abolition of the board and the transfer of some
of its functions to a new authority with a more limited agenda and com-
position. The Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta (Advisory Board
for Defense Information; MTS), administratively under the authority of the
32. The courses have maintained their prestige to the present day and are commonly viewed as
one of the main arenas for elite-level consensus-building in matters of foreign and security policy
in Finland. See, for instance, a recent research report on the long-term effectiveness of the national
defense courses: Peter Ekholm, Ymma¨rrysta¨ yli rajojen: Valtakunnallisten maanpuolustuskurssien vaikut-
tavuus (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2006). See also Laura Kolbe, Yhteista¨ turvallisuutta
rakentamassa: Maanpuolustusopetuksen ja—yhdistyksen vaiheita 1961–2011 (Helsinki: Maanpuolus-
tuskurssiyhdistys, 2011).
33. For a more detailed discussion, see Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War, pp. 142–146.
34. On the increasingly critical Soviet views and their influence on Finnish interpretations of neutrality,
see, for instance, Osmo Apunen, Silma¨n politiikkaa: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti 1961–2006 (Helsinki:
Otava, 2011); and Pekka Visuri, Ida¨n ja la¨nnen va¨lissa¨: Puolustuspolitiikka presidentti Kekkosen kaudella)
(Espoo, Finland: Fenix-Kustannus, 2010). For an English-language overview of this issue, see Rainio-
Niemi, The Ideological Cold War, pp. 139–142.
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Ministry of Defense, replaced the HMP board. The new board reincarnated
many of the older board’s subcommittees and main functions; notably, its
research, public information, citizen education, and opinion-polling activities
on neutrality specifically and on foreign and security policy more generally.
The MTS proved more resilient than its predecessor and continued to work
through the remainder of the Cold War to make neutrality known and ap-
proved by Finnish citizens.
The End of the Cold War: Continuity and
Discontinuity in Finnish Foreign Policy
As the geopolitical and geostrategic structures and conditions that had neces-
sitated Finland’s neutrality policy dissolved with the end of the Cold War, one
might have expected to see a corresponding change in Finnish foreign and
security policy. If the established view were correct and Finland’s neutrality
policy was nothing more than a byproduct of and an adaptation to the Cold
War’s bipolar international system, it should have disappeared once that sys-
tem collapsed, together with the various negative concepts associated with it,
such as Finlandization and the Finnish policy of appeasing Moscow. As British
political scientist David Arter wrote in an article published in 1996, Finnish
neutrality
had been a “designer neutrality”, designed to the particular requirements
of Finland’s post-war situation and tailored to the realities of the nation’s
Ostpolitik. . . . The design ultimately became passe´—dated by the collapse of
Cold War security configurations—and, to a degree, discredited by its association
with the past.35
According to this view, Finland’s 1995 membership in the EU and its aban-
donment of neutrality policy brought to a close this chapter in the history of
Finnish foreign relations.
The end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991,
and EU membership did, of course, change the external context and the
requirements and institutional conditions of Finnish foreign policy. Other
authors have described Finnish foreign policy at this juncture as having been
in a “transformative phase” that resulted in the “narrowing down” of Finnish
35. David Arter, “Finland: From Neutrality to NATO?” European Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter
1996), pp. 614–632.
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neutrality to the concept’s military-strategic core.36 The main reasons for this
change were the requirements of EU membership, which were seen to have
made the principles and practices of Finland’s Cold War neutrality obsolete.
However, neither this transformation nor the emergence of the new foreign
policy consensus was as swift and thorough as is commonly assumed. The
turnaround from neutrality policy to “military non-alignment” was planned
and executed by a relatively small group of policymakers in early 1992 and
rested on narrower political and popular opinion foundations than the approval
of neutrality in the Cold War. Although Finland’s post–Cold War foreign policy
is in some respects strikingly discontinuous from its Cold War–era policy—
primarily thanks to the demands emanating from Finland’s EU membership—
many basic assumptions were carried over from the earlier period.
The deep entrenchment of neutrality in Finnish foreign policy doctrine
could be seen when superpower dialogue was resumed in the mid-1980s. Even
though the renewal of de´tente raised hopes in Finland for a less-constrained
international posture, the basic foreign policy line—neutrality combined with
a well-functioning working relationship between Finnish and Soviet leaders
and the maintenance of economic and other ties with the rest of the world—
did not change. President Mauno Koivisto (1982–1994) placed much faith
in the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, as a bold reformer, achieving a
“genuine dialogue” with him early on, as Koivisto describes in his memoirs.37
Nonetheless, Koivisto did not seek to use the suddenly more flexible Soviet
attitude as an excuse for departing from or widening the boundaries of tradi-
tional Finnish Cold War neutrality. To the contrary, he sought to strengthen
that neutrality, using policies and initiatives mostly inherited from his pre-
decessor. In addition to pursuing a stronger and more credible neutral status
for Finland, Koivisto wanted the country to be actively involved as a neutral
bridge builder in East-West diplomacy.38 By following this line, he could rely
36. Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf, and Rutger Lindahl, Non-alignment and European Security Policy:
Ambiguity at Work (Helsinki: Finnish Institute for International Affairs; Bonn: Institut fu¨r Europa¨ische
Politik, 2000), pp. 86–154; Kari Mo¨tto¨la¨, “Puolueettomuudesta sitoutumiseen: Turvallisuuspoliittisen
perusratkaisun muutos kylma¨sta¨ sodasta Euroopan muurokseen,” in Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani
Vaahtoranta, eds., Johdatus Suomen ulkopolitiikkaan: Kylma¨sta¨ sodasta uuteen maailmanja¨rjestykseen
(Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 1993), pp. 62–135; Raimo Va¨yrynen, “Kylma¨sta¨ sodasta uuteen maail-
manja¨rjestykseen: Suomen ulkopolitiikan kansainva¨linen ympa¨risto¨,” in Forsberg and Vaahtoranta,
eds., Johdatus Suomen ulkopolitiikkaan, pp. 25–61; and Alpo M. Rusi and Jukka Salovaara, “Kylma¨n
sodan ja¨lkeinen epa¨varma rauha: Suomi Euroopan kehittyva¨n turvallisuusalueen osapuolena,” in Fors-
berg and Vaahtoranta, eds., Johdatus Suomen ulkopolitiikkaan, pp. 136–165.
37. Mauno Koivisto, Kaksi Kautta II: Historian tekija¨t. (Helsinki: Kirjayhtyma¨, 1995), p. 173. See also
his translated memoirs, Witness to History (London: Hurst & Company, 1997).
38. Koivisto, Witness to History.
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on solid domestic support and favorable public opinion, although his luke-
warm attitude toward Baltic aspirations for independence was criticized in
1990–1991.
Not wanting to risk his main goals, Koivisto favored a low-key approach
toward the institutions of West European cooperation, and only after a pe-
riod of protracted reflection did he allow the Finnish government to carry
through a long-planned and -discussed membership in the Council of Eu-
rope in 1987–1989, a time when no socialist countries were yet members.39
Koivisto’s maintenance of this careful line was ultimately rewarded in October
1989, when Gorbachev paid a state visit to Helsinki and explicitly acknowl-
edged Finnish neutrality without the customary reservations.
When analyzing Finnish foreign policy at the end of the 1980s, one must
bear in mind that the preservation of the status quo and the anchoring of
neutrality policy in it had been one of the fundamental elements of the policy
throughout the Cold War.40 At the same time, Finnish foreign policymakers
considered the international system to be extremely stable, even as the Cold
War was coming to a close. An important factor in Finnish analysis of super-
power relations at the end of the 1980s was the assumed persistence of the
international system’s bipolar structure and the related constraints it placed on
the other actors. Shortly before the political upheavals of 1989 in East-Central
Europe, officials at the Finnish Foreign Ministry anticipated that the relax-
ation of the Cold War would significantly reduce the likelihood of large-scale
conflicts, but they did not anticipate any changes beyond that and did not
foresee any movement toward a multipolar or unipolar international system.
The de´tente of the late 1980s, on the contrary, was thought to have created
better conditions for the stable and predictable functioning of the bipolar
system.
In his 1988 doctoral dissertation, Finland’s long-time Foreign Minister
Paavo Va¨yrynen, then chairman of the Centre Party and the pivotal force
in the making of the Kekkonen-era foreign policy consensus, predicted that
conditions surrounding Finland’s established neutrality policy would remain
essentially stable.41 Gorbachev’s reforms potentially strengthened the super-
power status of the Soviet Union. To Va¨yrynen, the East-West ideological and
power-political standoff seemed unlikely to disappear completely. What was
39. Aunesluoma, Vapaakaupan tiella¨, pp. 399–403.
40. Esko Antola, “The Burden of History: Finland as a Status Quo Country,” The International
Spectator, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1994), pp. 65–79.
41. Paavo Va¨yrynen, Finlands utrikespolitik—Den nationella doktrinen och framtidens ma¨nsklighetspolitik
(Juva, Finland: So¨derstro¨ms & C:o Fo¨rlags AB, 1988), pp. 206–210, 302.
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more likely to happen, he believed, was that the European Community (EC)
and leading Western European countries would adopt a higher profile and gain
in significance compared to the United States, which seemed to be retreating
from European defense and from European politics in general as a result of
the new de´tente.
Geopolitical bipolarity remained the basic assumption behind Finnish
foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and its
succession by a much weaker and less globally oriented power, the Russian
Federation. However, even after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia was
expected to play a key role in European security, albeit in a less menacing if
also less predictable way. In any case, a weaker Russia was still strong enough
for Finland, and, so the reasoning went, a need to maintain bilateral Finnish-
Russian relations provided a rationale for many observers to maintain rather
than abandon the neutralist line toward Finland’s eastern neighbor.42 Even for
those who were willing to consider and support more far-reaching changes in
Finnish foreign policy, the general systemic uncertainty only strengthened the
perceived need for a reactive rather than proactive foreign policy.43
Although Finnish policymakers did eventually decide to redefine their
country’s neutrality policy in a fundamental way in 1992, the upheavals of
1989 in East-Central Europe gave a crucial fillip to the process. Three distinct
developments influenced Finnish neutrality policy during this period: (1) the
end of the Cold War superpower confrontation and the related European
developments in 1989–1990; (2) the breakup of the Soviet Union itself in
1991; and (3) Finland’s decision in 1992 to seek EU membership.
As soon as the political democratization of Soviet-bloc countries in East-
Central Europe began in earnest in 1989, the Finnish foreign policy commu-
nity understood that the events would have systemic consequences far beyond
what had been anticipated earlier. This realization, however, did not lead
to a reconsideration of neutrality policy as a vehicle with desirable benefits
for Finnish security. On the contrary, emboldened by Gorbachev’s expression
of unequivocal support for Finnish neutrality during a visit to Helsinki in
42. This was a key argument among the traditionalist neutralist camp, which campaigned against
Finland’s EU membership before 1995. Keijo Korhonen, Luota Suomeen, suomalainen! (Helsinki:
Kuva ja Sana: 1993); and Jan Magnus Jansson, “Finland mellan Ryssland och EU,” Finsk tidskrift,
1994, pp.111-118.
43. The “search for stability” thesis is the main argument in Jaakko Blomberg’s extensive volume on
Finnish foreign policymaking at the end of the Cold War, published in 2011 and based on personal
recollections and documentation. Blomberg was a key official in the Finnish Foreign Ministry at
the time and responsible, among other things, for policy planning functions. See Jaakko Blomberg,
Vakauden kaipuu: Kylma¨n sodan loppu ja Suomi (Helsinki: Werner So¨derstro¨m Osakeyhtio¨, 2011).
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October 1989, Finland took advantage of the situation by consolidating its
neutrality policy even further and maintaining the foreign policy tactics and
doctrine that had been adopted during the worst crises of the Cold War.44 If
officials had harbored doubts in the past about how well neutrality served the
ultimate goal of safeguarding the nation’s interests, those doubts by 1990 had
been cast aside.45
Finland responded to the changes that followed the political upheavals of
1989 with a combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral diplomatic
initiatives and approaches, all of which were aimed at maximizing Finland’s
security and sovereignty as a neutral country. The most important step was
taken in 1990, when the Finnish government unilaterally reinterpreted the
1947 Paris Peace Treaty obligations and restrictions on Finland’s military ca-
pabilities and also revised the 1948 FCMA Treaty’s stipulations concerning
Germany in light of the reunification of Germany and the consequent disap-
pearance of the conditions that had been in place when the treaty was originally
signed.
Known as “Operation Pax,” the revision of the treaties, orchestrated by
President Koivisto and carried out by a small group of civil servants and
advisers, was announced in September 1990 to the astonishment of observers in
and beyond Finland. The Finnish government now interpreted the Paris Peace
Treaty’s many restrictions on Finland’s defense as having lost their meaning.46
The FCMA Treaty’s references to the threat from Germany were considered to
have become similarly obsolete.47 Whereas the political upheavals in Europe
in 1989 had not fundamentally altered Finland’s own international position,
the unification of Germany (and the Soviet Union’s acquiescence) did mark
a fundamental shift. Nonetheless, remarkably little change was made at this
44. A good example of this was a speech by Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio in January 1990 in which
he stated that Finland’s position remained unaltered despite the ongoing changes in Europe. See
Ulkoasiainministeri Pertti Paasio Euroklubin seminaarissa 31.1.1990, http://www.eilen.fi/2893/.
45. Even Paavo Lipponen, one of the most vocal opponents of the view that Finland’s neutrality
was grounded in Finnish identity during the Cold War, chose his words carefully in 1990, when the
opportunity arose for a radical shift in Finnish foreign policy: “Finnish foreign policy is equal to the
concept of neutrality policy. The position of neutrality has been considered the main goal of foreign
policy—for President Urho Kekkonen it was his life’s work.” (The original in Finnish is: “Suomen
ulkopolitiikka samastetaan laajalti ka¨sitteeseen puolueettomuuspolitiikka. Puolueettomuusaseman tur-
vaaminen on koettu ulkopolitiikan pa¨a¨tavoitteeksi—presidentti Urho Kekkoselle se oli ela¨ma¨ntyo¨.”)
See Paavo Lipponen, preface to Raimo Va¨yrynen, ed., Suomen puolueettomuuden tulevaisuus (Helsinki:
WSOY, 1990), pp. 7–12. In his other writings, Lipponen nonetheless sought to distance himself from
Finland’s neutrality, instead pushing for its fundamental revision.
46. Koivisto, Witness to History, pp. 359–365.
47. On Operation Pax, see the account of one of the actors on the Finnish side, Rene´ Nyberg, “‘Olette
kajonneet yya-sopimukseen,’” Kanava, No. 1 (2008), pp. 4–11.
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stage in the definition and understanding of Finland as a neutral country
positioned between the East and the West.
Continuity in Finnish neutrality policy remained strong even in the fol-
lowing year, when the Soviet Union itself began to fall apart as a result of
failing reforms and growing dissatisfaction in the Soviet republics and their
push toward full independence. After the attempted coup in August 1991
failed to restore the authority of the Communist Party and hardline rule in
Moscow, the Finns began making preparations to renegotiate the entire FCMA
Treaty. Their goal was to renew the treaty in a form that would allow Finland
to follow neutrality policy in a more politically and legally credible form, as
well as to pave the way for a successful EC membership bid, should that op-
tion be opened to Finland. Prior to December 1991, there was no prospect
of Finnish membership because the organization’s doors were closed to new
members pending its internal reform and consolidation, which was agreed in
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Finland pursued the renewal and redrafting of
the 1948 FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, but events
soon overtook the negotiations. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union,
the treaty was buried and replaced by a largely ceremonial cooperation treaty
between Russia and Finland.48
In addition to these unilateral and bilateral operations, multilateral diplo-
macy served the same end. Finland’s increased activity in multilateral diplo-
matic arenas such as the CSCE (and its successor, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe) and the UN Security Council, where Finland
was a rotating member in 1989–1990, was in part motivated by a genuine wish
to see these actors gain strength and importance in international affairs. For the
most part, however, Finland was following a policy established in the 1960s,
according to which activity in multilateral international institutions primarily
served to strengthen Finland’s status as a neutral country and a diplomatic
intermediary in international politics.
The end result of the events of 1990–1991 was that any obvious checks on
Finland’s neutrality policy had disappeared. By this point, however, the biggest
challenge to Finnish neutrality was not the Soviet Union or the Cold War
endgame but developments in European integration.49 Without the need to
modify Finland’s neutrality policy to fit the requirements of EU membership,
48. Blomberg, Vakauden kaipuu, pp. 407–439.
49. This view was widely shared at the time and was anticipated in the late 1980s to create pressure
on Finland to revise its neutrality policy. See Harto Hakovirta, “The Nordic Neutrals in Western
European Integration: Current Pressures, Restraints and Options,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 22,
No. 2 (September 1987), pp. 265–273.
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Finnish foreign and security policy might have undergone little further change
in the 1990s. At the same time, the change that did occur was less compre-
hensive than suggested by the official rhetoric, which was designed to win over
Finland’s skeptical would-be partners in the newly created EU.
Whereas Operation Pax and the strengthening of Finland’s neutrality at
the close of the Cold War are a relatively straightforward story, the European
integration process in the early 1990s put Finnish political leaders on the
horns of a dilemma. By the end of 1991 and the EC’s Maastricht summit,
it had become clear that the EC was moving toward a deeper economic and
political union and that it planned to start membership negotiations with
new applicant countries such as Austria and Sweden. This changed the whole
context of Finnish integration policy as well as that of the other European
neutrals.
From the late 1950s on, Finland had participated in economic integration
through a series of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements and therefore
had managed to separate the economic from the political in its foreign trade and
integration policies.50 Neutrality, not to mention Soviet reservations, blocked
Finland from participating in or developing close institutional relations with
the EC. At the same time, a line was drawn between integration policy and
neutrality. This moved the purely economic and trade aspects of integration
to the forefront when dealing with the EC and separated other foreign policy
issues into a different category.
As was the case in East-West relations, Finnish views on integration policy
were first and foremost conditioned by the need to preserve and strengthen
neutrality. As long as Finland was not itself willing to join the EC, and given the
development toward a political union and the higher profile it might assume in
international politics, the rationale for the continuation of Finland’s neutrality
policy was still intact. Even though Finnish leaders were deeply interested in
the economic aspects of European integration, political developments within
the community and the EC’s aspirations for a great-power role in world politics
made membership impossible to consider.51
50. Aunesluoma Vapaakaupan tiella¨, pp. 88–91; Tapani Paavonen, Vapaakauppaintegraation kausi:
Suomen suhde La¨nsi-Euroopan integraatioon FINN-EFTA-sopimuksesta EC-vapaakauppaan (Helsinki:
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1988); and Harto Hakovirta, Puolueettomuus ja integraatiopolitiikka:
Tutkimus puolueettoman valtion adaptaatiosta alueelliseen integraatioon teorian, vertailujen ja Suomen
poikkeavan tapauksen valossa (Tampere, Finland: Acta Universitatis Tamperensis, 1976), Ser. A:78.
51. Foreign Trade Minister Pertti Salolainen’s speech “La¨nsi-Euroopan integraatio,” Helsinki, 29 March
1988, in Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1988 (Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministerio¨n julkaisuja,
1989).
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At first, the traditional, neutralist, semi-detached integration policy
seemed to work in the post–Cold War environment. Until early 1992, the
goal of Finnish integration policy was to safeguard Finnish economic and
trade interests by securing access to the single European market when it be-
came operational in 1993. Neutrality policy did not have to be modified to
achieve this goal, which would be fulfilled via the European Economic Area
(EEA) agreement that had been negotiated between the EC and European
Free Trade Association members from 1989 to 1992 and was scheduled to
enter into force in 1994.
Among Finnish policymakers, from the president on down, the primary
goal was to negotiate the EEA agreement first and only after that to consider
whether EC membership might be possible. This was the policy until late
autumn 1991. President Koivisto was most reluctant to go further than this,
and when he finally changed course and began to support EU membership,
he considered it primarily in economic terms and not as a definite break or a
new opening in foreign and security policy.52 Members of Esko Aho’s Centre
Party government (1991–1995), including Foreign Minister Paavo Va¨yrynen,
held similar views and stressed the continuity of Finland’s neutrality even as
the country was moving toward EU membership. Va¨yrynen went so far as to
claim that Finland had reverted to the neutrality policy it had followed before
the Second World War.
The decision to enter the EU compelled Finnish leaders—from the pres-
ident on down, including, in 1994, the voters in a referendum—to redefine
Finnish neutrality in a way that would be compatible with EU member-
ship. However, the outcome was not the wholesale abandonment of the previ-
ous policy that Finland’s EU membership application would have one believe.
The starting point of Finland’s application in 1992 was that it accepted the
Maastricht Treaty as a point of departure for its membership, including the
treaty’s plans to develop common defense and foreign and security policy, as
well as the political goals enshrined in the union’s finalite´ politique. Acceptance
of these points precluded the sort of neutrality that Finland had embraced
during the Cold War. However, as could be seen in the acceptance of Sweden,
Austria, and Finland, each with its own individual characteristics, legacies, and
foreign policy profiles, the EU was willing to be flexible.
52. In a Swedish-language memoir, Koivisto writes that he himself thought the “road to [EU] mem-
bership was not necessarily the one we should take. We did not know what it would mean. My starting
point was that we would not give up our right to make our own security and foreign policy decisions.
On the other hand, we could not include in our membership application reservations in security policy
matters, which might then be rejected. Where would we be standing then?” Mauno Koivisto, Grannar:
Fra¨ndskap och friktion (Stockholm: Atlantis So¨derstro¨ms, 2008), pp. 189–190.
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Given the EU’s willingness to accommodate Finland and the other Cold
War European neutrals within its newly created structures of foreign and
security policy and defense cooperation, Finnish foreign policymakers were
uncertain how far Finland should go in reformulating its neutrality policy. In
the end, neutrality was narrowed from its maximalist Cold War definitions
to the more traditional definition of military non-alignment in peacetime.53
In addition, the Finnish government proclaimed its commitment to credible
national defense. The new formulation was agreed in early 1992 together with
the decision to apply for EU membership and was described as follows:
In the constellation that has emerged after the Cold War, the nucleus of Finland’s
neutrality policy is emphasized to remain outside military alliances, so that
in a possible war situation or during a military crisis our country could remain
neutral. In support of this goal, Finland maintains an appropriate national defense
capability, which is credible in relation to its security environment.
This language retains much of the older policy, and the stress on military
non-alignment and an independent, credible national defense capability belies
not a move toward closer de facto alignment but the preservation of as much
of Finland’s Cold War neutrality as possible in the new situation. As such, the
phrase “Finland’s neutrality policy” is characteristic of the new line.
This foreign policy platform and definition of military non-alignment
became the established position when Finland handed in its application to the
commission in Brussels in March 1992, and it remained the basic definition of
Finnish foreign and security policy long into the future. Subsequently, it was
amended to include a stronger commitment to the EU’s common foreign and
security policy and to its crisis management operations, and even to include
an “option” to seek NATO membership if the need arose.
However, the extent to which the remnants of neutrality could be recon-
ciled with EU membership continued to divide opinion in Finland.54 Finnish
diplomats spent much of their time and energy trying to allay any remaining
suspicions within the EU about the level of Finland’s commitment to the
53. Ojanen dates this narrowing or “softening” process to 1988–1990 using governmental reports to
the parliament as evidence, but the evidence is too murky to warrant a conclusion of actual change in
neutrality policy formulations before 1991–1992. Ojanen, Herolf, and Lindahl, Non-alignment.
54. On the Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy thinking in the EU and the debates in the
parliament on foreign policy, see Teemu Palosaari, The Art of Adaptation: A Study on the Europeanization
of Finland’s Foreign and Security Policy, TAPRI Studies in Peace and Conflict Research 96 (Tampere,
Finland: TUP, 2011); and Jussi Seppa¨la¨, “Europe through a Nation’s Eyes: Explaining Finland’s
Orientation towards EU Security Integration,” in Tuomas Forsberg, Timo Kivima¨ki, and Liisa Laakso,
eds., Europe in Context: Insights to the Foreign Policy of the EU, Finnish International Studies Association
Publications, No. 1, (Espoo, Finland: Fenix-Kustannus, 2007), pp. 21–35.
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Maastricht Treaty. Not everybody in Brussels or the other European capitals
was so easily prepared to accept that “neutral” Finland had so swiftly aligned
itself behind the EU’s political goals.55
A good deal of continuity existed in Finnish foreign and security policy
even during the period of systemic change at the end of the Cold War and
even in the terms in which Finland became a member of the EU in 1995.
When an opportunity arose to strengthen Finland’s neutrality policy after
1989, Finnish foreign policymakers quickly and firmly took advantage of it.
However, only with much reluctance and internal wrangling within the Finnish
government was Finnish neutrality narrowed down to its military-political core
and reformulated to fit the requirements of EU membership. Even then, the
transformation from the neutrality policy of the Cold War era into a more active
and engaging foreign policy within the EU was an incremental process and
not quite the fresh start that Finland’s new pro-European and pro-Atlanticist
leaders wanted Finland’s new—and rightly suspicious—EU partners and the
Finnish people to believe it was.
Conclusion
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Finland’s political elite, with some exceptions,
were determined to let go of neutrality together with the end of the Cold War
confrontation. In the mid-1990s, the concept was narrowed to military security
policy before vanishing from the vocabularies of official policy. Neutrality was
seen to have no role whatsoever once Finland joined the EU, because EU
membership was thought to replace neutrality as an instrument and framework
of Finland’s participation in international affairs. Public opinion, however, did
not grow more supportive of Finland joining NATO, and public support for
a common European defense and security policy as well as the EU’s foreign
and security policy remained lower in Finland and the other formerly neutral
EU member-states than in the NATO member-states.56
This article shows that the observed durability of the legacy of neutrality,
especially at the level of mentality and identity, can be understood through
a historically grounded analysis of the multilayered and embedded nature of
55. To¨rnudd, “Ties,” pp. 37–68; and Ojanen, Herolf, and Lindahl, Non-alignment, p. 103.
56. In the Eurobarometer public opinion monitoring series, “the neutral countries” are frequently
mentioned as a group that stands out as being below the European average in their support for
common European foreign and security policy. For more, see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion
/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.
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neutrality policy during the Cold War. Finland’s Cold War policy of neutrality
cannot be reduced to mere pragmatism and strategic thinking. Neutrality be-
came an integral part of how common people and policymakers alike thought
about Finland. That is, neutrality became a part of Finland’s national identity
and a key element in its distinctively national state ideology.
Moreover, at the close of the Cold War, neutrality was not just a useful
foreign policy option and a tool to maximize Finnish sovereignty within the
rigidities of the current international system but a source of real, tangible secu-
rity and even self-esteem and pride in the arenas of international cooperation
and diplomacy. What eventually challenged the doctrine of neutrality was not
so much the end of the Cold War but European integration. Yet, even after
joining the EU in 1995, the popular legacy of Finland’s Cold War neutrality
remained alive, reflected both in public opinion and in a more widely held
wish to remain on the outside of the various military crises and conflicts of the
2000s in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.
Finland’s Cold War neutrality was perpetually overshadowed by Finland’s
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and, especially, the FCMA Treaty.
These relations encouraged Finnish leaders to anticipate Soviet stances, which,
in turn, facilitated debates on Finlandization. For Finland, the link between its
Cold War neutrality and Finlandization has so far been a relatively harmless,
if inconvenient, historical burden that has undoubtedly contributed to the
will to abandon the concept of neutrality as a whole. The Finnish debate on
Finlandization has not been a history debate in any academic sense. Rather,
it has been a debate about political identity and Finland’s “belonging to the
West,” to Europe, and to the various cores of the EU. Even though the debate
on Finlandization made political sense in the context of the mid-1990s and
onward, it should not be seen as the historically most accurate interpretation of
Finland’s Cold War neutrality and its meanings. Finland’s historical neutrality
needs to be considered from a new, broader perspective, one informed by
scholarship, that recognizes neutrality’s multilayered and embedded features
and their significance in the creation and durability of Finnish collective
identities in the twentieth century and beyond.
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